EXCERCISE N°3 – Write the abstract of your paper

REsearch
Dear all,
by thursday 23 february you will have to post your proposal for the paper you will write to validate our course. This proposal should consist of:
1) The title
2) An abstract of no more than 250 words indicating the topic and they way you would like to analyse it;
3) Two or three bibliographical references constituting the starting point of your research.
The paper will have to analyse a EU negotiation (internal or external) using the ten points for preparation that are included in the chapter 2 of “The First Move” from Aurelien COLSON that you will find here in attachment.
Best European regards,
Francesco MARCHI
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30 responses to “EXCERCISE N°3 – Write the abstract of your paper

  1. EU- Mauritania Negotiations: Fisheries Partnership Agreement

    The fishery sector is an important and crucial part of the Mauritania economy. There has been a breakdown during the recent negotiations between the European Union and the Mauritania over the new fisheries protocol. The protocol is contentious between the two.

    The 2014 partnership agreement contained of many progressive measures due to the lobbying efforts of fishermen and the activists of Mauritania. Given the history, Spain has once again voiced out it’s discontent in the collapsing of the latest agreements with the belief of discrimination against the Spanish fleet. This resulted in the breakdown of the negotiations between European Union and Mauritania.

    In the year 2015, the European Union and Mauritania renewed a 4 years protocol to the Fisheries Partnership Agreement (FPA). This new renewed protocol confirms the several decades of cooperation in the field of fisheries, which is a key sector for the development of Mauritania and is also beneficial for the European Union strategy for the blue growth.

    The Protocol was signed and entered into provisional application on 16 November 2015. It will enter into force when the necessary procedures for its conclusion have been completed, including the consent of the European Parliament. (According to the EU Commissions)

    I would be analysing the negotiations between the EU and Mauritania, with regard to the complications faced by the supposedly discrimination against Spain, as claimed by them, while also analysing the previous dissent expressed by Spain over the migration policy with regard to Mauritania.

    References:
    1. Mauritania|Fisheries – EU Commission Report : https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/international/agreements/mauritania_en

    2. EU-Mauritania restart negotiation for Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement : http://agritrade.cta.int/en/layout/set/print/Fisheries/Topics/ACP-EU-relations-FPAs/EU-and-Mauritania-restart-negotiations-for-a-Sustainable-Fisheries-Partnership-Agreement

    3. Migration, Fisheries, and the supremacy of European interests in Mauritania : http://www.migreurop.org/article2633.html?lang=fr

  2. Elizabeth Tudor-Bezies

    Two Heads, One Body: The Challenges of the EU’s Peacebuilding and Enlargement Positions in Bosnia and Herzegovina

    This paper will attempt to determine how the EU’s positions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, both as a peacebuilding actor and as the enlargement actor, have affected Bosnia’s progress towards joining the EU and becoming a fully functioning state without international intervention.

    In 2003, the EU’s Thessaloniki Agenda presented the Balkan nations with a specific future – eventually, these countries will become part of the EU. However, the EU faces a conflict within its own strategy with the potential candidates, namely Bosnia. On the one hand, the EU has to apply the same regulations, with some additional requirements, to Bosnia. On the other hand, the EU’s occupation in Bosnia as a peacebuilding actor makes this application more complicated. The EU still has a military mission (EUFOR Althea) in Bosnia and the High Representative (HR) who oversees the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) comes from an EU country. In a post-conflict country still deeply divided, the EU struggles between its roles as the statebuilder, and as the hard negotiator in the enlargement process.

    This paper will analyze how conflicting interests, conflicting mandates and insufficient coordination can limit progress both within negotiations and in meaningful reforms. The EU failed to help the country successfully negotiate political reforms such as constitutional reform. Also, instead of discouraging the increase of ethnonationalism, the EU rewarded Bosnia with short-term visa-free travel within the Schengen zone. Therefore, the EU demonstrates a lack of clarity in its actions and provides rewards without necessarily seeing true progress.

    References:
    -Barbulescu, Iordan Gheorghe and Miruna Troncota. “The Ambivalent Role of the EU in the Western Balkans – “Limited Europeanisation” between Formal Promises and Practical Constraints. the Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina.” Romanian Journal of European Affairs 12, no. 1 (03, 2012): 5-26

    – Juncos, Anna E. (2012) Member state-building versus peacebuilding: the
    contradictions of EU state-building in Bosnia and Herzegovina, East European Politics, 28:1, 58-75

    – Vachudova, Milada Anna. “EU Leverage and National Interests in the Balkans:The Puzzles of Enlargement Ten Years On.” Journal of Common Market Studies. Vol. 52(1). 2014. pp. 122-138.

  3. The elaboration of a new European Security Strategy

    The paper will attempt to focus on the negotiations processes in which European Member-states are committed in the elaboration of a new common security strategy for the European Union. On the 12th of December, 2003 has been released the European Security Strategy, which is a document aiming to define a common strategy concerning security and defence issues of the European territory. This document is the results of the consequent negotiations that have been led during the 1990’s and early 2000’s between the Member-states. However, the security and defence issues are constantly mutating and the common strategy have to stay updated in order to remain efficient. In the 2015 Munich Security Conference, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, has stated that the Union needed a new security strategy and she has launched a consultative process aiming to open negotiation.
    The definition of a common security strategy for the European Union is a typical example of topic which requires long and intensive negotiations between the Member-states, as it is a topic related directly to the sovereignty of the States. So this common statement requires an high level of consensus and many compromises from the Member-states, but also the participation of other actors. As stated Federica Mogherini, “A strategy that is not drawn up in a closet by a select few, but through a broad process that involves the Member States and EU institutions as well as the foreign policy community including academia and think tanks, the media and civil society.”

    Indicative bibliography
    HIX,.Simon and HØYLAND,.Bjørn. The political system of the European Union. Palgrave Macmillan Editions, 2011.
    BISCOP, Sven and WHITMAN, Richard. The Routledge handbook of the European Security. Routledge, 2013.
    DINAN,.Desmond. Europe Recast, A history of European Union. Palgrave Macmillan Editions, 2014.
    European Security Strategy. 2003.

  4. Mathieu COLLÉTER

    A failed negotiation and a divided EU: analysis of the Conference of the Parties (“COP-15”) of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) negotiation on Atlantic bluefin tuna

    CITES regulates international trade in wild species through permitting and certification. An important aspect of the regulation is the listing of endangered species in the CITES Appendices I and II. Species listed in Appendix II are species that while not currently threatened by trade, risks becoming so if trade continues unregulated. In March 2010, during the COP 15, the negotiation to list the Atlantic bluefin tuna failed despite the dire state of the fish stock. This paper seeks to analyze the important EU position during this negotiation, with notably a proposed modified version of the listing delaying the inclusion for one year that was rejected during a vote, as the initial proposal. We will also describe the difficult internal EU negotiation to define a common position before the international meeting and its impacts. This multilateral negotiation is of high interest, since it enables to highlight the difficulty to include endangered marine species on the listing when facing the strong influence of financial and national interests. Japan, Canada, and other countries opposed to the listing and were able to gather a majority against notably the EU and the USA. We will finally analyze the impacts of this failed negotiation on the public opinion and management of this iconic fish stock.

    References
    BBC News – Bluefin tuna ban proposal meets rejection [WWW Document], n.d. URL http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8574775.stm (accessed 2.23.17).
    Political infighting threatens survival of the bluefin tuna [WWW Document], 2009. . The Independent. URL http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/nature/political-infighting-threatens-survival-of-the-bluefin-tuna-1782087.html (accessed 2.23.17).
    Sky, M.B., 2009. Getting on the List: Politics and Procedural Maneuvering in CITES Appendix I and II Decisions for Commercially Exploited Marine and Timber Species. Sustain. Dev. Law Policy 10, 35

  5. Colette Mahieu-Talbot

    The intra-UK dimension of Brexit negotiations with the EU.

    Disputes between the UK’s central and devolved governments over the UK’s departure from the EU has led to lack of cohesion within the group and no ‘united front’ on Brexit negotiations with the EU. Notably, Scotland and Northern Ireland voted by a clear margin to remain in the EU. In a news conference in December 2016, Michel Barnier stated that negotiations would be “legally complex”, and that different arrangements for different UK countries would make them even more so. Barnier has mentioned resolving issues in Northern Ireland along the Irish border (the UK’s only land frontier with the EU), but regards Scotland as an internal matter for Britain to resolve ahead of triggering the exit process – which May ends to do by the end of March 2017 – and entering into formal negotiations (though once talks are underway, Barnier may accept to talk with the Scottish government as an interested party).
    Nicola Sturgeon, Scotland’s first minister, has made it clear that she wishes to keep Scotland in the single market. This option was ruled out by chancellor Philip Hammond, and confirmed following May’s announcement in January 2017 that the UK would be exiting the single market.
    The Scottish government had also been among the parties represented in the case to make a parliamentary vote mandatory before the exit process could be triggered. Scotland had wished for the UK to seek the consent of devolved administrations for Brexit legislation. The Scottish government has also been consulting on a draft referendum bill to keep the option of another independence vote a possibility. However, Scotland exports 4 times as much to the rest of Britain as it does to the EU, so re-joining the EU’s single market at the expense of leaving Britain’s may not make economic sense.

    I will examine turbulent relations within Britain and their potential effects further down the line in Brexit negotiations, as well as possible options sought out by Scotland and impacts on its relationship with Whitehall.

    Articles to start:
    The Dalriada Document: Towards a Multinational Compromise that Respects Democratic Diversity in the United Kingdom, B. O’Leary, The Political Quarterly, Volume 87, Issue 4, October–December 2016, pp. 518–533

    Scotland and Brexit: the state of the Union and the Union State, C. McCorckindale, King’s Law Journal 2016.
    http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09615768.2016.1254405

    Brexit: the view from Scotland, J.M. MacKenzie, The Round Table 2016.
    http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00358533.2016.1210924?needAccess=true

  6. How the factor of “people” creates “zopa” in Iran talks?

    My paper will be on the EU 3+3 talk on Iran’s nuclear file. The historic moment on July 14, 2015 when the deal is finalized in Vienna, brings to an end of 12-year stand-off, and marks the new beginning of an era in relations between Iran and the west. The key progress in this difficult negotiation was the change of mandates to achieve their unaltered interests on the two sides, Iran and the US—main adversaries in this multi-layered diplomatic game. This change is timing-induced: Iran at this time has really suffered from economic isolation, volatile geopolitical environment, and undergone wave of domestic discontent, and the new regime of Rouhani put more emphasize on lifting the country out of sanction; after 2012 when Obama enters his second term, he saw how Syria has become a black hole that prevents a foreseeable solution while depleting political capital, at this time, he changed the representative for Iran talk from Hilary to Kerry, and modify the mandate from “zero nuclear” to allow Iran have a limited nuclear capability (enrichment of uranium limited to 5%) which needs at least one year to “break out”, i.e. to produce a bomb. This creates “zopa” i.e. zone of possible agreement.

    At the same time, stakeholders mapping–interests of the rest 5 countries, China, France, Germany, UK, Russia, all provide strong geopolitical& economic motivations to solve the issue and lift the sanction, be it to maintain a politically stable ally in the turbulent Middle East (Russia), or to satisfy its oil & gas importation need (China) or to seize the timing to invest in and export to Iran (France, UK, Germany).

    Bibliography:
    https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/02/iran-nuclear-talks-timeline

    http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/statements/docs/2013/131219_02_en.pdf
    https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/CEPS%20Commentary%20on%20Iran%20S%20Blockmans.pdf

  7. Migration as bargaining tool – Powershift in EU-Turkey negotiations

    The EU and Turkey have a long ongoing negotiation relationship which is characterized by a back and forth between frictions and conciliation. In my paper I would like to examine the negotiations and their aftermath of the “EU-Turkey Action plan” while keeping in mind their connection with the accession process. The paper will take a look at how the relation between the two parties changed over time and in what way this influenced the negotiation outcomes (Personal Relation). Of further interest will be what other actors might have played a key role in the process determining the success or failure of conversations (Stakeholder Map). The agreement caused widespread discussions about to what extent the EU-deal with Turkey was justifiable in regards to tough bargaining strategies on the side of turkey and the controversial ways in which they were publicly announced (Justification, Communication). Therefore it will be enlightening to uncover ‘Solutions away from the table’ plus those actually brought to the table and which of these were finally implemented.

    BIBLIOGRAPHY
    Çelenk, A. A. (2016). ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS AND THE NEW EU STRATEGY OF TURKEY: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT/KATILIM MÜZAKERELERY VE TÜRKYYE’NYN YENY AVRUPA BYRLYDY STRATEJYSY: ELESTYREL BYR DEDERLENDYRME. Erciyes Üniversitesi Iktisadi Ve Idari Bilimler Faküeltesi Dergisi, (47), 85-99. Retrieved from https://acces-distant.sciences-po.fr/http/search.proquest.com/polcoll/index/docview/1829471237?accountid=13739

    Asli Okyay & Jonathan Zaragoza-Cristiani (2016) The Leverage of the
    Gatekeeper: Power and Interdependence in the Migration Nexus between the EU and Turkey, The
    International Spectator, 51:4, 51-66, Retrieved from:
    http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2016.1235403

    İçduygu, Ahmet (2014) Two-to-Tango in Migration Diplomacy: Negotiating Readmission Agreement between the eu and Turkey, European journal of migration and law, Volume: 16
    Numéro: 3, Page: 337-363

  8. Brexit negotiations: Can two sides come to the best terms after a bad breakup?

    Almost all experts are unanimous: Brexit is bad for the European Union and Britain. The triggering of Article 50 means that negotiations will happen and will take two years – or longer. This negotiation is unique, as it is the only one of its kind to ever happen thus far in the EU. It is one where the expert negotiators coming together will likely bring very different solutions to the table. In addition to this, due to the peculiarity of the situation it is possible that negotiators will bring preexisting interpersonal relationships and preexisting ideas about the diplomats across the table. What I would therefore like to do is analyze the beginnings of this negotiation by using the “ten points for preparation” outlined by Colson. In addition to this, I would like to research the debate on what would be the optimal outcome of Brexit negotiations as well as what experts predict as the likely outcome of such negotiations. The goal of this paper therefore to synthesize current literature on the future of Brexit negotiations as well as to analyze the ongoing negotiation through the application of negotiation theory.

    Working Bibliography:

    Tallberg, Jonas. “The power of the presidency: Brokerage, efficiency and distribution in EU negotiations.” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 42.5 (2004): 999-1022.
    http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.0021-9886.2004.00538.x/full

    Dür, Andreas, and Gemma Mateo. “Choosing a bargaining strategy in EU negotiations: power, preferences, and culture.” Journal of European Public Policy 17.5 (2010): 680-693.
    http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13501761003748666

    Boulanger, Pierre, and George Philippidis. “The End of a Romance? A Note on the Quantitative Impacts of a ‘Brexit’from the EU.” Journal of Agricultural Economics 66.3 (2015): 832-842.
    http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1477-9552.12120/full

    Pisani-Ferry, Jean, et al. “Europe after Brexit: A proposal for a continental partnership.” Bruegel External Publication, Brussels (2016).
    https://ces.fas.harvard.edu/uploads/files/Reports-Articles/Europe-after-Brexit.pdf

    Dhingra, Swati, and Thomas Sampson. “Life after BREXIT: What are the UK’s options outside the European Union?.” (2016).
    http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/66143/

  9. The European Defence Community and the bargain over German rearmament: from a successful negotiation to a failed ratification

    With the invasion of South Korea by the communist North Korea in 1950, the US began and European governments began to consider options to improve European defence. The corollary of this was the question over the contribution of Germany to this effort and therefore the issue of rearmament Germany, which was an important controversy among the Allies. The US made a proposal which foresaw German rearmament and integration of German forces into NATO, but France rejected the idea of a German NATO membership and responded with its own plan: the creation of a European Defence Community (EDC) with a supranational army.

    My paper will analyse the negotiations for EDC which were conducted from 1950 and 1952 between France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux and succeeded in the signing of the Treaty of Paris. However, the Treaty ultimately failed because French parliament voted against its ratification, although France was the country which initiated the negotiations. In this context, I will try to identify and explain the shifts in the bargaining positions of the different parties during the negotiations and during the ratification process. I will put particular focus on the French position, since it was the country who initiated the negotiations but drifted into a hard bargainer after the signing of the agreement, creating a bargaining deadlock which ultimately led to the failure of the EDC. In order to explain this, I will discuss the role of stake holders in the negotiations, the domestic situation in France and the international events between 1950 and 1954.

    Bibliography:

    A European Army? The European Defense Community and the Politics of Transnational Influence in Post-War Europe, 1950-1954, Björn Fleischer, Bremen 2015.

    The European Defence Community: A History, Edward Fursdon, London 1980.

    http://www.cvce.eu/recherche/unit-content/-/unit/b9fe3d6d-e79c-495e-856d-9729144d2cbd/35082b97-6b47-4cc2-8105-fea7504d548a/Resources#4a3f4499-daf1-44c1-b313-212b31cad878

  10. Title:
    The United Kingdom’s pre-Referendum negotiation with the European Union: how a strong interpersonal relationship and a common interest almost kept the UK in the EU

    Abstract:
    This paper will analyse the negotiations between the United Kingdom (UK) and the other 27 member states of the European Union (EU) from June 2015, when UK Prime Minister David Cameron announced his intentions to strike a deal with other member states to reform the EU, and February 2016, when this very deal was finalised. Specifically, the paper will aim to understand how, despite having different motivations and almost diverging mandates, the two leaders in charge of the negotiations, Prime Minister Cameron and European Council President Donald Tusk, were successful in reaching an agreement and (temporarily) prevented the UK from choosing its Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement: ‘Brexit’.

    The paper will look at the events chronologically by studying how the two sides’ motivations and proposed solutions were moulded over the period of eight months in order to reach the final agreement. First, attention will be devoted to the initial motivations of both the UK and the other EU member states, as well as both sides’ relationship and points of disagreement. Then, the paper will focus on how the February 2nd bilateral accord was reached between Cameron and Tusk, by focusing on how constant communication and interaction between the leaders set the ground for a good working relationship. Finally, the paper will analyse the latter part of these negotiations that took place at the European Council of mid-February 2016 and how different stakeholders were consulted to reach a final agreement that was acceptable by all 28 EU member states.

    References:
    BBC (20 February 2016) ‘EU reform deal: What Cameron wanted and what he got’ [news article]
    http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-35622105

    European Council’s (2016) timeline of ‘Negotiations ahead of the UK’s EU referendum’ [government website]
    http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/uk/2016-uk-settlement-process-timeline/

    Eva-Maria Poptcheva & David Eatock (2016): The UK’s ‘new settlement’ in the European Union Renegotiation and referendum [book/publication]
    http://bookshop.europa.eu/is-bin/INTERSHOP.enfinity/WFS/EU-Bookshop-Site/en_GB/-/EUR/ViewPublication-Start?PublicationKey=QA0216168

    Frank Vibert (2016): On the edge: David Cameron’s EU renegotiation strategies [book]
    http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/65194/1/Vibert_on_the_edge.pdf

  11. In 2015, the European Union received an unprecedented 1.3 million irregular migrants, but with no collective mechanism in place to cope with the deluge of Syrian refugees arriving daily from Turkey. On March 18, 2016, in an act of creative bargaining, the European Union and Turkey negotiated a political settlement that would stymie irregular migration from Turkey to the E.U., and provide Turkey with certain political and economic benefits within the European Union, namely visa liberalization, resurgence of accession negotiations, and humanitarian aid funds.

    In theory, this agreement of independence should be mutually advantageous for both negotiating parties. However, given power and leverage disparities at the time of negotiation, the European Union witnessed immediate benefit while Turkey’s political profits remain unrealized and conditional on unanimous member state consensus.

    This piece will focus on the negotiators’ transition from creative bargaining to positionalism, framed between negotiation and post-implementation. As a second facet of interest, this essay will analyze the leverage disparity between the parties at both time of negotiation and following implementation, and the consequences therein. Furthermore, the precedent EU-Turkey diplomatic relationship will be underscored, as well as the long or short-term nature of each parties’ goals.

    “EU-Turkey Statement.” European Council Report. 18 March 2016, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18-eu-turkey-statement/. Accessed 20 November 2016.

    “Timeline-Response to Migratory Pressure.” European Council Report. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/migratory-pressures/history-migratory-pressures/?taxId=600&p=1 Accessed 23 February 2017.

    “European Council on Migrations.” European Council Report. 18 February 2016. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/02/18-euco-conclusions-migration/ Accessed 23 February 2017.

    “Turkey Threatens to End Refugee Deal in Row Over EU Accession.” The Guardian. 25 November 2016.
    https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/25/turkey-threatens-end-refugee-deal-row-eu-accession-erdogan Accessed 23 February 2017.

  12. What role for the EU in achieving success on the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue?

    Good neighbourly relations are among the key pre-conditions for all candidate member-states who want to join the EU. Serbia’s European aspirations inevitably require finding viable solution to its relations with Kosovo. The EU achieved a major breakthrough by convincing the two sides to sit down on the same table and discuss key contentious areas for both. Due to obvious political reasons, the EU named this negotiation attempt Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue (and not Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue).

    A key interpersonal enabler for this to happen is the role being played by the High Representative and the civil servants in Brussels. Neither side is ready to talk to the other unless there is an EU presence and each time a problem occurs, either Belgrade or Pristina calls Brussels to do the mediation between the two.

    The EU exercises a special form of authority in this case because both countries are inextricably interested in joining the EU, therefore, willing to adhere to European values. The motivations of all sides are different but the end result for the EU is to ensure lasting stability in the Western Balkans by providing positive incentives to both parties. Facilitating the normalisation of relations in Brussels on a neutral territory is another major enabler to the whole process. Therefore, this paper will critically assess the effectiveness of the EU’s negotiation and mediation strategies in a region where EU foreign policy has been heavily criticised for being reactive rather than proactive.

    Bergmann, J. and Niemann, A. (2015) “the Mediating International Conflicts: The European Union as an effective peacemaker?”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 53(5): 957-975
    Economidies, S. and Ker-Lindsay, J. (2015) “Pre-accession Europeanization: the case of Serbia and Kosovo, 53(5): 1027-2044
    Gross, E. and Rotta, A. (2011) “The EEAS and the Western Balkans”, Instituto Affari Internazionali, http://www.cosv.org/download/centrodocumentazione/iaiwp1115.pdf

  13. The role of the EU in climate change negotiations during COP21

    In 2015, for the first time ever, 195 countries agreed on taking action to tackle climate change and adapt to it. The EU, which has always been a world leader on theses issue, played a great role in this success.

    Among the questions we will address, we will try to understand what was the mandate of the EU representatives and the different member states representatives in these negotiations, and how they did manage to deal with the variety of actors involved (businesses, NGOs, associations and interest groups). We will also analyse the “solution” the countries agreed on and the keys of success that led to an agreement with 195 countries involved. We will also have a look at what would have been the cost of no agreement, as it happened in Copenhagen in 2009. Finally, we will study the process of the negotiation and the great organisation needed to conduct it.

    References:
    – Report of the Conference of the Parties on its twenty-first session, UNFCC website (http://unfccc.int/bodies/body/6383/php/view/reports.php#c)
    – The European Union and the Paris Agreement: leader, mediator, or bystander? Sebastian Oberthür and Lisanne Groen (http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/wcc.445/full)
    – Climate Change and the European Union’s Leadership Moment: An Inconvenient Truth? Charles F. Parker and Christer Karlsson (http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2010.02080.x/epdf)

  14. Lucas Winkelmann

    European negotiations on the evolution of the ETS

    The Emission Trade System was implemented in the EU following the Kyoto protocol and divided in three phases. The first one was a pilot phase (2005-2007) to evaluate the number of permits to allocate. The actors had no visibility over the system and the prices fell dramatically when the data were made public. The second period (2008-2012) coincided with the Kyoto timeline and objectives but the prices fell once again after 2008. The main problems were that the prices fell down because of the crisis which reduced the production and that the initial allocation of the permits nationally was excessive. Today, the Commission has taken the lead for the 3rd phase (2013-2020) to allocate the permits and is slowly reducing its number.

    The prices remain however really low and many talk about a failure while discussions are still ongoing to adjust the ETS and make it more efficient. Current negotiations have several issues at stakes:
    • setting the way quotas will be allocated in the future
    • deciding which sectors must be included in the scheme
    • linking different Trading Systems (Switzerland, Australia)

    The objectives of the paper would be to analyse how the negotiations took (and are taking) place. First, by looking at the relation between the different actors (public and private) and what are their interests. Then, by highlighting the shifts in the political and economic context and the way they impacted the decisions on the ETS. It will be done in relation with the ten points presented in the chapter 2 of “The First Move” from Aurelien COLSON.

    Bibliography:
    “Emission Trading Design”, Stefan A.Weishaar
    “The New climate policies of the EU”, Sebastian Oberthur and Marc Pallemaerts
    “Rescuing EU Emissions Trading: Mission Impossible?” Jørgen Wettestad

  15. Michele Bellini

    Title: The Greek Referendum: a double-edge sword in the negotiation strategy

    On June 26th, 2015 Alexis Tsipras, the head of the Greek government and leader of Syriza, which had previously won the general elections under the promise of ending austerity, announced that the package of austerity measures proposed by the creditors would be put to a popular vote. He used this move after five months of difficult negotiations and particularly, after the fourth negotiation failure in eight days, in a (desperate) attempt to turn the negotiation table and gain more leverage on Greece’s creditors. Although the referendum overwhelmingly rejected the creditors’ plan, on July 13th Tsipras capitulated and accepted a final package, which was even tougher than the one proposed to the Greek people. According to a EU senior official, the package was harsher also because the “no” had won and the government campaigned for that answer, making the referendum weapon backfire on the proponent.

    Thorough the lenses of negotiation analysis, this paper will attempt to understand the reasons behind calling a referendum as well as why this move, even though it obtained the desired outcome, was not enough to improve Greece’s negotiation position and, in fact, did worsen it. The theoretical assumption is that something went wrong in the preparation phase and later caused this miscalculation by the Greeks. Given the complexity and the length of the Greek Bailout negotiations, the analysis will focus on the relatively short timespan before and after the referendum (June-July 2015).

    Preliminary Sources:

    https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/26/greece-calls-referendum-on-bailout-terms-offered-by-creditors

    https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jul/12/greek-crisis-surrender-fiscal-sovereignty-in-return-for-bailout-merkel-tells-tsipras

    https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/08/syriza-referendum-podemos-austerity/

    Zahariadis, N. (2016). Values as Barriers to Compromise? Ideology, Transnational Coalitions, and Distributive Bargaining in Negotiations over the Third Greek Bailout.

    Pitsoulis, A., & Schwuchow, S. C. (2016). Holding out for a better deal: Brinkmanship in the Greek bailout negotiations. European Journal of Political Economy.

    Zahariadis, N. (2016). Bargaining power and negotiation strategy: examining the Greek bailouts, 2010–2015. Journal of European Public Policy, 1-20.

  16. The European Constitution: proof of failed negotiations?

    Thorough this paper we will try to determine if the failure of the ratification of the European Constitution is the result of a poor negotiation process.
    If it had ever been ratified, the European Constitution would’ve replaced all of the previous European treaties and it would’ve had a legal effect over all the signatory countries. Amidst the strengthening policies that were drafted, we can locate the creation of a European foreign policy, a EU Foreign Minister, it would’ve incorporated the EU charter of Fundamental Rights, and it would’ve also reduced the areas for which the Council needed unanimity.
    The drafting and negotiation processes began in 2001 and 25 Member States signed the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe in 2004. However, as we now know, the referendums in the Netherlands and in France were unfavorable for the ratification of the treaty and thus, it was consequently paralyzed for the entirety of the European Union.
    During this paper, we will therefore try to answer to the following three leading prerogatives: what were the actors and contents contended during the negotiation process; did they fail; and finally, if yes, why did they. Additionally, we will also make a comparison between the European Constitution and the Lisbon Treaty (that is now in vigor).

    Working bibliography:
    – Kimmo Kiljunen, The European Constitution in the Making, Center for European Policy Studies Brussels, 2004. Retrieved from: http://aei.pitt.edu/32581/1/20._EU_Constitution.pdf
    – William A. Niskanen and Marian L. Tupy, “A Hard Look at the European Constitution”, Techcentralstation.com, 2005. Retrieved from: https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/hard-look-european-constitution
    – ARENA Centre for European Studies, ensemble of positions and questions from the different EU countries related to the European Constitution. Retrieved from: http://www.unizar.es/euroconstitucion/Treaties/Treaty_Const_Neg_institutions.htm
    – BBC News, Quick Guide: European Union Constitution. Retrieved from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/pop_ups/quick_guides/04/europe_european_union_constitution/html/1.stm
    – Michael Holmes et Knut Roder, The Left and the European Constitution. From Laeken to Lisbon, Manchester University Press, 2012
    – Florence Deloche-Gaudez, La constitution européenne, Presses de Sciences Po (P.F.N.S.P.), « Nouveaux Débats », 2005

  17. Title: From coercive diplomacy to constructive engagement: strengths and constraints of the EU3+3 in the Iranian nuclear crisis

    The objective of the paper is to assess the role and the contribution of the European diplomacy in the negotiation and settlement of the Iranian nuclear crisis (2003-2015).

    As it well known, in July 2015, the Islamic Republic and the representatives of the EU3+3 (Germany, France and Great Britain plus United States, Russia and China) reached in Vienna the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the so-called nuclear deal. The JCPOA was a triumph for diplomacy and the reaffirmation of the view that complex issues should be resolved through dialogue and discussion rather than through confrontation.

    Even if the U.S. and Iran are often considered the major partners of the negotiations, the European Union played a pivotal role in all the stages of the nuclear crisis and contributed to facilitate the multilateral talks in the person of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Solana, Ashton, Mogherini).

    Specifically, the paper will analyse the different phases of the nuclear controversy, highlight the shift from a bargaining/coercive approach to a consensual/constructive one and focus on the different positions and interests at stake.

    References

    1. Full Text of the Iran Nuclear Deal, in The Washington Post. Link: https://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/world/full-text-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal/1651/

    2.Kaussler, B. (2013). Iran’s Nuclear Diplomacy: Power Politics and Conflict Resolution. Routledge.

    3. Shirvani, T., & Vuković, S. (2015). After the Iran Nuclear Deal: Europe’s Pain and Gain. The Washington Quarterly, 38(3), 79-92.

    4. Dr Lynne Dryburgh (2008) The EU as a Global Actor? EU Policy Towards Iran, European Security, 17:2-3, 253-271

  18. The Frozen Frontier
    An India- EU free trade agreement would be conspicuously beneficial for both parties as they are each other’s 1st and 9th largest trade partners respectively. However, after an extensive 16 rounds of negotiations on the subject starting in 2007 the two parties have reached a stalemate, freezing all official negotiations since 2013. In July of 2016 Indian Commerce Minister Nirmala Sitharaman meet with EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström to discuss re-mobilizing the trade agreement in the aftermath of Brexit. Unfortunately, several prerequisite demands, and old hostilities remain in play preventing the negotiations from officially restarting despite several small group meetings between the newly appointed EU chief negotiator and her Indian counterpart. This paper will analyze the dynamics of the previous negotiations and present positional dynamics.
    The focus of the paper will be in addressing the several key elements that continue to block the recommencing of formal negotiations, the various actors at play, and the underlying tension between the two parties and their core priorities. Both parties are predicted to proceed with caution limiting their mutual growth possibilities. The hard bargaining tactics introduced in the initial negotiations may persist due to India’s nationalist ambitions and the EU uncertain future as the result of Brexit. Thus, negotiations are unlikely to lead an amicable solution outside the zero-sum game paradigm.
    Sources:
    1.”European Commission Directorate-General for Trade.” India – Trade – European Commission. Accessed February 21, 2017. http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/india/.

    2.Khorana, Sangeeta, and Nicholas Perdikis. “EU-India Free Trade Agreement: Deal or No Deal?” South Asia Economic Journal 11, no. 2 (2010): 181-206. doi:10.1177/139156141001100202.

    3.Wouters, Jan, Idesbald Goddeeris, Bregt Natens, and Filip Ciortuz. “Some Critical Issues in the EU-India Free Trade Agreement Negotiations.” European Law Journal 20, no. 6 (2014): 848-69. doi:10.1111/eulj.12109.

  19. Maria JUROVCIKOVA

    CETA Negotiations: perspectives of multiple stakeholders

    Negotiations on Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between European Union and Canada began in 2009 and were concluded in 2014. Despite the expressive opposition from the civil society, in February 2017 European Parliament took a final vote and supported CETA.
    As the most ambitious trade agreement that the EU has ever concluded, covering not only trade policy (as exclusive competence of the EU) but also other aspects including environment, property rights, investment protection etc., CETA raised lots of question on the competence division; and therefore involvement of different stakeholders and their mandate played crucial role in the negotiations. The paper will examine what were the main obstacles holding back the agreement negotiations (mainly position of Wallonia, Belgium; position of the European Commission towards “mixed agreement”, the opposition of the public society) and how the stakeholders managed to overcome them. The paper will undertake the analysis of prevailing tactics (bargaining or problem solving) on different stages of the negotiations and further ratification processes in the Canada, EU and its Member states.

    Bibliography:
    Teresa Healy (2014) Canadian and European Unions and the Canada—EU CETA Negotiations, Globalizations, 11:1, 59-70, DOI: 10.1080/14747731.2014.860798

    Valerie J. D’Erman: Comparative Intergovernmental Politics: CETA Negotiations between Canada and the EU. Politics and Governance (ISSN: 2183-2463) 2016, Volume 4, Issue 3, Pages 90-99 doi: 10.17645/pag.v4i3.565

    Kurt Hubner et al.: CETA:The Making of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement Between Canada and the UE, Notes de l´Ifri. 2016. ISBN:978-2-36567-550-5

    What is Really the Matter with the EU-Canada CETA Trade Agreement? 29 October. 2016
    http://www.globalresearch.ca/what-is-really-the-matter-with-the-eu-canada-ceta-trade-agreement/5553717
    Ceta: EU parliament backs free trade deal with Canada.15 February 2017.
    http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38979901
    Belgium Walloons block key EU Ceta trade deal with Canada. 24 October 2016.
    http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37749236

  20. Nazlı Gül Uysal

    Negotiating with an “Empty Chair”: Lessons from the First Major Crisis of European Integration

    I would like to analyse the “Empty Chair Crisis” of 1965, a seven-month-long stalemate which arose when France’s representatives refused to attend any EEC meetings due to disagreement over the Commission’s proposal on the financing of Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). I believe this important episode, which is known as the first major crisis in the history of European Integration, encapsulates the fundamental dilemmas that occasionally surface during various negotiation situations within the EU and is therefore worth attention.

    My evaluation of the crisis will be based on Colson’s “Ten Trumps for Preparation” framework. Accordingly, after a brief discussion of the historical background, I will focus on “the people” (Charles de Gaulle, the staunch nationalist president of France vs. Walter Hallstein, the Commission president known as a keen European federationist); “the problem” (the commission’s proposal on CAP that envisaged greater powers for both the Commission and the Parliament, as well as transition to majoritarian voting in the Council); and “the process” (the Commission’s move, escalation of the crisis, the stalemate, the Luxembourg compromise) dimensions of the negotiation that culminated in such a crisis. I will then conclude with a few remarks on what the Empty Chair Crisis and its resolution, the Luxembourg Compromise, can teach us about the nature of negotiations within the context of the EU.

    Bibliography (tentative)
    -Resources related to the Empty Chair Crisis on CVCE’s digital library of European Integration http://www.cvce.eu/en/collections/unit-content/-/unit/02bb76df-d066-4c08-a58a-d4686a3e68ff/62cd6534-f1a9-442a-b6fb-0bab7c842180/Resources#f6d19361-9a7a-4e39-ae93-0f898e652d85
    -Palayret, Jean-Marie, Helen Wallace, and Pascaline Winand. Visions, Votes and Vetoes: The Empty Chair Crisis and the Luxembourg Compromise Forty Years on. 2006.
    -Cogan, Charles G. French Negotiating Behavior: Dealing with La grande nation. 2003.
    -Ludlow, N. Piers. “Challenging French Leadership in Europe: Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the Outbreak of the Empty Chair Crisis of 1965â1966.” Contemporary European History vol. 8 no. 2 .1999. 231-48.
    -Official documentation

  21. The role of European Union in « COP21 » : negotiating climate under constraints. 

    Issues of representation, interests and communication between various stakeholders.

    In 2015 occurred the 21st Conference of Parties (COP) in Paris which led to the ratification of an agreement between all the parties : 195 countries plus the European Union.

    While the result of this conference is still debated, we will focus on the issues of preparation for the EU. We will especially study on a multi-scale approach the legitimacy of the EU, its mandate for the upcoming negotiation regarding the EU representatives, the member states’ representatives, the citizens. We will also study the difficulty to compose with an extreme variety of stakeholders and persons concerned from the public to the private sector, NGOs, citizens and the complexity of stakes and interests. This case is particularly interesting because it contains conflictual elements for the process of negotiating an issue in the name of the « common good ». Finally, we will find interesting elements concerning the process of this negotiation : great logistic needs and tremendous communication especially through mediatization.
    

What paths did the EU follow in these negotiations and how did it prepare to these levels of complexity ? 



    References :

    Oberthür S. & Groen L. (16 November 2016), The European Union and the Paris Agreement: leader, mediator, or bystander?, WIREs

    Schreurs A. M. (2016), The Paris Climate Agreement and the Three Largest Emitters: China, the United States, and the European Union, Politics and Governence

    Vaughan A. (18 September 2015), EU united for ambitious, binding agreement at Paris talks, says climate chief, The Guardian

  22. The 2015 EU-Greece Budget Negotiations

    This paper will focus on the negotiations between the greek government and the EU institution + the IMF (assimilated to the “Troïka”). As negotiations over the greek debt and deficit are long lasting and can be seen as starting from Papandreou decision to make a referendum and continuing today, the paper will focus on a specific period, maybe considered as a cornerstone in the negotiations: the 2015 summer one.
    At this time, Siriza is in command for a few months and has to negotiate with creditors regarding its dept. Greece has been implementing many reforms since Papandreou and its deficit has drastically reduced. So the Greek government, for whom Varoufakis and Tsipras are leading the talks, is seeking for a different arrangement than the past ones: essentially a cut in their debt as a reward for past efforts and a chance for implementing alternative policies to austerity.
    As the IMF, the ECB and the European Commission refused alternative solutions than a new austerity plan, Tsipras called on a referendum (as Papandreou a few years earlier) to ask if the Greek people agree or not on the proposed plan. They voted no and Tsipras was called on new negotiations.
    As things remain not very clear yet in my mind: Tsipras was asked to accept a new deal as greek banks were shutting out. A “Grexit” was mentioned as a potential solution not to threaten the Euro and Varoufakis, who was asked to resign after the referendum, had imagined a potential alternative banking system to sustain greek economy in case of such a “Grexit”.
    The 10 points will be analyzed there including these potential alternatives or “Plan B”.

    First sources:
    Press articles
    https://euobserver.com/news/129487
    https://euobserver.com/news/129482
    https://euobserver.com/economic/129526
    https://euobserver.com/news/129570
    https://euobserver.com/opinion/129629

    Academic articles
    – COLSON, Chapter 2
    https://www.policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/National%20Office/2015/03/Monitor_Mar2015.pdf

    Official sources:
    http://www.consilium.europa.eu/fr/meetings/eurogroup/2015/07/7/
    – Déclaration du sommet de la zone euro. 12 Juillet 2015

    others to come

  23. Filippo PIEROZZI

    The European Neighborhood Policy: the constraints to EU action. Member States’ agendas and contingent dynamics.

    The Joint Communication 2015 (50) Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy marked a step forward in the lengthy and cumbersome development of the ENP.
    Nevertheless, the negotiations’ dynamics that have led to the current framework should be addressed in-depth. Since the very beginning of the intra-EU debate (2002) on how to tackle the unstable situation that would emerge in the new borders after the enlargement of the Union, the negotiations on ENP have been mainly characterised by a bargaining dynamic among Member States’ that has curtailed the European Union’s actorness in this policy area.

    A second stage – reflecting the different stakeholders’ motivations and proposed solution – starts in 2009 when Germany and France have played a pivotal role in advancing the main initiatives (the EaP on the one hand, the UfM on the other) and sought an active involvement in engaging external actors, often acting as informal substitutes of EU institutions.
    The period before the 2015 was marked by the burst of the Arab Spring and – despite the entrepreneurial role of the Commission, the basically unchanged configuration of power within the EU did not allow significant changes to EU initiatives.
    Finally, the adoption of the Communication in November 2015 marked the culmination of a process launched by EC’s President Juncker: thorough consultations have been carried out with partner countries and MS, involving not just governments, but civil society, the private sector, social partners, financial institutions etc.
    In such a tangled scenario, we will try to assess the room for manoeuver available for the EU and how external events have contributed to shaping the ENP.

    A testing bench for such a multifaceted policy are will be provided by the 2015 Review itself and particular attention will be devoted to how contingent events – apparently not related to the issues on the table – could contribute to shape the negotiations, as this has proved to be the case for the framing around a securitization discourse of the ENP Review, issued in the immediate aftermath of Paris’ Terror Attacks.

    References

    European Commission (2015) Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy, Brussels, 18.11.2015 JOIN(2015) 50 final

    Kourtelis, C. (2015) Negotiating the ENP at Level II: A Three-Stage Process in The Political Economy of Euro-Mediterranean Relations: European Neighbourhood Policy in North Africa, 42-68

    Barbé, E., & Johansson‐Nogués, E. (2008). The EU as a modest ‘force for good’: the European Neighbourhood Policy. International affairs, 84(1), 81-96.

    Aalberg, T., Strömbäck, J., & De Vreese, C. H. (2012). The framing of politics as strategy and game: A review of concepts, operationalizations and key findings. Journalism, 13(2), 162-178.

    Hahn, J. (2016) ‘Stronger Neighbourhood, Stronger Partnerships: A Revised European Neighbourhood Policy’ (2016) 21 European Foreign Affairs Review, Issue 1, 1–4

  24. EU-UK Brexit negotiations: Negotiating “the leap into the unknown?’’

    Since the results of Brexit referendum became public, the speculations about the form, duration, aims and outcomes of the EU-UK negotiations flooded the media. While the members of the European negotiation team have already been revealed to the public, all other specificities remain largely unknown. The aim of this work is to analysis the process of EU-UK Brexit negotiations through the prism of Colson and Lempereur (2010)’s “Ten trumps for negotiation preparation”. Thys, we consider three main dimensions of the negotiation process in question, namely: the relationship between different actors (“the people dimension”), the potential issues and content (“the problem dimension”) and the concrete organisation of the negotiation meeting(s) and the management of its progress (“the process dimension”). Furthermore, this work will rely on content analysis of news articles and statements of actors from both sides with the aim to predict the type of negotiations that will be put in place.

    Menon, A., Fowler, B. (2016), Hard or Soft? The Politics of Brexit, National Institute Economic Review, vol. 238, issue 1, pages R4-R12, http://econpapers.repec.org/article/saeniesru/v_3a238_3ay_3a2016_3ai_3a1_3ap_3ar4-r12.htm
    Pisani-Ferry, J., Röttgen, N., Sapir, A., Tucker, P., Wolff, G.(2016), Europe after Brexit: A proposal for a continental partnership, Center for European Studies, Harvard, https://ces.fas.harvard.edu/uploads/files/Reports-Articles/Europe-after-Brexit.pdf
    Juncker, Jean-Claude (2016a) ‘Speech by President Jean-Claud Juncker at the EP Plenary session on the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 28 June 2016 and the Informal meeting of the 27 Heads of State of Government of 29 June 2016’, European Council Meeting
    May, Theresa (2016), Speech on Brexit, April 25, 2016, available at http://www.conservativehome.com/parliament/2016/04/theresa-mays-speech-on-brexit-full-text.html

  25. In the face of growing international headwinds blowing against free trade, the recent vote by the European Parliament to approve the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between the European Union and Canada stands as an noteworthy endorsement of the liberal trade orthodoxy that is currently under siege. However, the endorsement was only possible because of a serious, and significant diplomatic push on behalf of the Government of Canada in order to convince reticent European partners.

    Despite these diplomatic overtures, opposition remained to ratifying CETA. While other pockets of vociferous opposition existed, that expressed by the sub-national regional government of Wallonia, was the most significant as it threatened to prevent Belgian ratification of CETA specifically, and its adoption entirely. As a result, the negotiation process between the Minister-President of Wallonia, the government of Belgium led by Prime Minister Charles Michel, the government of Canada represented by then Minister of International Trade, the Honourable Chrystia Freeland, and the European Union, represents an interesting case study because although trade policy is nominally the exclusive competency of the European Union, the influence exerted by Wallonia, and the pains the Canadian government took to reassure national parliaments (Minister Freeland speaking to the assembly of the Social Democratic Party in Germany is an example of this), suggest that this is perhaps not accurate in practice.

    As a result, understanding how Canadian and European politicians and officials overcame the opposition, and the current anti-free trade environment, is a useful exercise. This paper will attempt to do that.

    Baldwin, Mathew. “EU trade politics – heaven or hell?”, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 13, no. 6, (september), 2006, 926-942

    Cerulus, Laurens. “Meet Monsieur Magnette: The man who made Canada weep.” Politico Magazine, October 25, 2016. Accessed February 22, 2017. http://www.politico.eu/article/meet-monsieur-paul-magnette-the-man-killing-ceta-deal-trade-agreement/.

    Deblock, Christian, and Michèle Rioux. “From Economic Dialogue to CETA: Canada’s Trade Relations with the European Union.” International Journal, vol. 66, no. 1, 2010, pp. 39–56., http://www.jstor.org/stable/27976070.

    Meunier, Sophie, Kalypso Nicolaïdis. “EU Trade Policy: The Exclusive versus Shared Competence Debate.” Cowles, Maria. The State of the European Union: Risks, Reform, Resistance, and Revival. Vol. 5. Oxford: Oxford U Press, 2000. 325-46. Print.

  26. Silvia Trajcikova

    EU-Russia Negotiations: The Kaliningrad Issue

    With the accession of new Member States, especially Lithuania and Poland, into the EU and Schengen, Kaliningrad region was going to find itself completely cut off the Russian mainland. Both the EU and Russia were concerned about Kaliningrad´s issue. Vladimir Putin proposed to resolve it by establishing a visa-free regime between the EU and Russia. The EU was not that keen on resolving the issue in this way. By September 2002, they sat down for the first time to negotiate the issue. Moscow has offered tighter controls on train and bus tickets to and from its Kaliningrad enclave, and non-stop trains through Lithuania. Even this didn´t seem to be a good solution for the EU. Despite this, Russian Prime Minister Kasyanov push hard publicly for an entirely visa-free regime for Kaliningrad residents. Finally, both actors agreed on issuing of the ‘Facilitated Transit Document’ for Kaliningrad residents and even on concluding a readmission agreement which was crucial for the EU.

    The uniqueness of the main object of the negotiations and the fact that Russia was sitting on the other side of the table make this case very interesting. The Russia is the most important neighbor of the EU, but the most difficult to handle. It is known for its combative negotiation style and tendency to dominate. A certain mistrust at the political level made the negotiations difficult, too. Therefore, my aim will be to examine the case in details in order to see how they managed to come to such agreement(s).

    Maass, Anna-Sophie, EU-Russia Relations, 1999-2015: From Courtship to Confrontation, (Routledge, 2016), pp. 58-64.
    Meerts, Paul (ed.), “Negotiating with the Russian Bear: Lessons for the EU?”, EU Diplomacy Papers 8/2009.
    Vitunic, Brian, “Kaliningrad: No Easy Answers”, Euractiv.com, 21 October 2002 (updated 29 January 2010), https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/opinion/kaliningrad-no-easy-answers/

  27. Past, Present and Future of the EU – Turkey accession negotiations
    (((“Where Have All the Flowers Gone?”)))

    In recent times EU Member States’ scepticism towards Turkey’s accession is growing, this could be rooted as in the complex reality in Turkey at the present moment, as well as heavily established perception patterns, and unclear demands. In addition, the new, strengthened position of current Turkey’s leader Erdogan is bringing many questions on the Brussels agenda. The migration crisis in 2015 and the attempt of a coup last year conditioned that scenario. In the 2011 political election campaigns none of the mainstream Turkish political parties devoted serious attention to the EU either in a positive or negative way (Cengiz and Hoffmann, 2011).
    Arguably, in the face of Europe’s struggle with economic crisis and Turkey’s contrasting recent economic performance the Turkish government no longer perceives EU membership as imperative to ensure economic growth and development, as maybe it used to. On the other hand, the Turkish liberal and intellectual elite feels very much disappointed by the EU, as they hold the EU responsible for Turkey’s stagnating democratic reform process. Ultimately, stringent requirements imposed by member states on visa liberalisation for Turkish citizens within the EU are blocking country’s incentives towards the negotiation process and implementation of the EU liberal and democratic requirements. Up to day, Turkey remains the only candidate country that has no visa-free travel for its citizens to the EU. The EU position thus, has also been criticized as controversial, due to its conditionality in gender issues, and minority protection.

    Webiography/ Bibliography:

    1. “Turkey reacts angrily to symbolic EU parliament vote on its membership”, published on Thursday 24 November 2016 17.45 GMT by Jennifer Rankin in Brussels and Kareem Shaheen, The Guardian, accessed on 20 Feb 2017
    link: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/24/eu-parliament-votes-freeze-membership-talks-turkey

    2. “Turkey’s 10 years of EU accession negotiations: no end in sight”, published on 5/10/2015 by William Chislett, Real Instituto EL CANO, accessed on 20 Feb 2017

    link: http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/wp14-2015-chislett-turkeys-10-years-of-eu-accession-negotiations-no-end-in-sight

    3. HOFFMANN, L. and CENGIZ, F. (editors) “Turkey and the European Union. Facing new challenges and opportunities”. First published in 2014 by Routledge, New York and London

    (more sources on request)

  28. Immaculada Miracle

    The EU CAP Reform Negotiations: What future for Europe?

    The future elaborated paper will be focused on studying the ongoing negotiations of the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) for the post-2020 period. The CAP was established by the Treaty of Rome and since then it has been under continuous reflections and reforms.

    The mission of this paper is observing how far the reform of the CAP can play a big role in the redefinition of the EU governance. Therefore, the main objective of this study is analyzing if the current negotiations of the CAP can be either categorized as a Positional Arguing or as Transformative Problem Solving type, aiming to see if the ongoing CAP reform is promoting status quo or innovation (Kay, 2011), respectively.

    The European Commission claims that during the previous years, the environmental, rural and local development concerns have been more present in the CAP (European Commission, 2013: 2-6). Therefore, in the upcoming paper it may be expected to find out that the EU will take advantage of the CAP as a window of opportunity to strengthen synergies between different policy sectors as well as to reform the EU strategy of global governance in line with the Sustainable Development Goals. Therefore, the hypothesis set out considers that the current CAP negotiations will represent a step towards the Transformative Problem Solving type of negotiation. Both the hypothesis and the potential conclusions mentioned will be either corroborated or refused throughout the analysis developed in the paper.

    The main variables that will guide the conducted analysis are: yields varieties, land use, farmers’ income, agricultural employment rates and conditions, and food diversity. All these factors will be studied through the 10 indispensable elements present in negotiation.

    BILBLIOGRAPHICAL RESOURCES
    Official Documentation
    ·COM(2010) 672 final
    ·European Commission. (2013) “Overview of the CAP Reform 2014-2020”, [online] [Accessed 17th February 2017] Available at http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/sites/agriculture/files/policy-perspectives/policy-briefs/05_en.pdf
    ·UN Office of the United Nations. High Commissioner for Human Rights (2011) “The Common Agricultural Policy towards 2020: The role of the European Union in supporting the realization of the right to food” [online] [Accessed 17th February 2017] Available at http://www.iatp.org/files/CAP%20Reform%20Right%20to%20Food.pdf

    Academic Articles
    ·Kay, A. (2011) “Path dependency and the CAP”, Journal of European Public Policy, 10-3: 405-420.

    Press Articles
    ·De Schutter, O. and Petrini, C. (2017). “Time to put a Common Food Policy on the menu”, [online] Available at http://www.politico.eu/article/opinion-time-to-put-a-common-food-policy-on-the-menu/
    ·RTE. (2017) “Hogan launching consultation over future of Common Agricultural Policy”, [online] Available at https://www.rte.ie/news/2017/0202/849472-hogan-cap-policy/

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